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Introduction
Money trails are like financial fingerprints. One reason why the 
focus after the 9/11 attacks was shifted quickly to measures 
to  combat  the  financing  of  terrorism  (CFT)  was  precisely 
because the money trails of the hijackers revealed blueprints 
for the architecture of the terrorist organisation. Yet, they 
also “served to expose all too clearly the vulnerabilities of the 
international banking system to terrorist fund generation, 
money laundering and general financial logistics” (Navias 
2002:  57).  CFT  programmes  were  introduced  to  address 
these vulnerabilities and were the first step taken by the 
US  in  its  “war  on  terror”  following  11  September  2001.   
As such, they have been the subject of considerable attention 
and led to new EU legislation and regulatory guidance to 
stop the flow of money to terrorist groups and to use the   
intelligence gathered from financial surveillance to identify   
and  prosecute  terrorists.  The  methods  used  to  combat 
terrorist financing are related to those initially developed for 
anti-money laundering (AML). 
  The  aim  of  this  article  is  first  to  disentangle  terrorist 
financing  from  money  laundering  and  to  describe  the 
techniques  used  by  terrorist  organisations  to  raise  and 
distribute funds.  The article then analyses the EU initiatives 
(policies) developed for CFT, the EU institutional framework 
(polity)  involved  to  cooperate  on  CFT  and  the  politics 
involved in the struggle to strike a balance between liberty 
and security.
Combating the Financing 
of Terrorism: EU Policies, 
Polity and Politics
Miriam Allam* and Damian Gadzinowski**
This article discusses the activities and initiatives undertaken by the European Union in Combating 
the Financing of Terrorism (CFT). The introduction of programmes to counter the financing of 
terrorism are derived from pre-existing anti-money laundering programmes and were the first 
step taken by the US in its “war on terror” following 11 September 2001.  As such, CFT has been the 
subject of considerable attention, and has given rise to new EU legislation and regulatory guidance 
to stop the flow of money to terrorist groups and to use the intelligence gathered from financial 
surveillance to identify and prosecute terrorists. The proposed counter-terrorism measures not only 
tighten controls on money transfers but also touch upon the highly sensitive issues of preventing 
the misuse of non-profit organisations by terrorists and the exchange of personal data. This article 
analyses the EU initiatives adopted (policies), the institutional framework for implementing the 
activities at the EU level (polity) and the wider consequences of this regulatory guidance on 
civil liberties (politics). While the European contribution to the “war on terror” is conventionally 
described as a matter of law enforcement and the execution of civilian and soft power, the article 
argues that the EU has gone beyond the international policy guidance, as revealed by the case of 
Kadi and al Barakaat. The article concludes that it is important to engage the public in a dialogue 
on liberty/security in order to reach a compromise on what is acceptable to manage the unease in 
the face of terrorist threats.
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sDefining and disentangling Terrorist Financing and 
Money Laundering
In its broadest sense, money laundering is defined as “the 
processing of […] criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal 
origin” (Financial Action Task Force 2009: 57). The objective 
of  money  laundering  is  to “clean”  and “legitimatise”  the 
ill-gotten  proceeds  of  criminal  activity. Thus,  the  process 
starts with dirty (illegal) money and ends with clean (legal) 
money. 
  In turn, terrorist financing is defined in the EU’s Third 
Money Laundering Directive as “the provision or collection of 
funds, by any means directly or indirectly, with the intention 
that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are 
to be used, in full or in part in order to carry out any of the 
offences  that  have  been 
defined  as  terrorism”.1 
  As  the  definition 
underlines,  the  focus  is 
on the purpose for using 
the  funds  and  not  on 
the  cleaning  process  of 
money.  In  fact,  funding 
to support terrorism may 
rely  on  both  legitimate  sources  and  criminal  activities. 
Some  scholars  therefore  argue  that  terrorist  financing  is 
reverse money laundering because the process may start 
with “clean”  money;  however,  the  purpose  for  which  the 
money is used is illegal (Roberge 2007). Certainly, the dirty/
clean money divide is not rigid but overlaps given that there 
are terrorist organisations that receive most of their funds 
through illegal sources such as drug trafficking, kidnapping, 
political corruption, smuggling, robbery and exploitation of 
human beings.2  
  Yet,  the  most  important  difference  between  money- 
laundering  and  terrorist  financing  is  the  very  different 
purpose  for  committing  a  crime.  Generally  speaking, 
criminal activity is driven by profit while terrorism is driven 
by political ends. Related to the immense profit that can be 
derived from criminal activities are the massive amounts 
of funds laundered yearly. According to the IMF, 2-5% of 
global GDP is laundered each year, representing 600 billion 
– 1.5 trillion US dollar (Camdessus 1998). Since profit is at 
the core of criminal behaviour, some scholars argue that 
organised crime acts like any multinational business that is 
driven by material interests to maximise income and wealth 
(Robinson  2003). Terrorist  organisations,  on  the  contrary, 
aim to accomplish specific political objectives and need the 
financing to fund their acts. In addition, terrorist financial 
requirements can often be relatively small compared to the 
deadly  disruption  caused.  For  example,  according  to  the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the direct costs required 
for  the  London  bombing  in  July  2005  are  estimated  to 
amount to 8,000 GBP and the Madrid bombing in March 
2004 to 10,000 euros (Financial Action Task Force 2008: 7). 
Yet,  these  figures  are  direct  costs  for  the  bombings  and 
disguise the fact that the logistical support for coordinating 
the  terrorist  groups  may  involve  a  much  larger  sum  of 
money. Another problem with terrorist financing is related 
to  the  definition  of  terrorism  itself.  The  EU  defines  acts 
of  terrorism  as  offences  which  may  “seriously  damage   
a  country  or  an  international  organisation  [which  are] 
committed  with  the  aim  of:  (i)  seriously  intimidating  a 
population,  or  (ii)  unduly  compelling  a  Government  or 
international  organisation  to  perform  or  abstain  from 
performing any act, or (iii) seriously destabilising or destroying 
the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social 
structures of a country or an international organisation”.3 
  The  EU  definition  has  been  widely  criticised  as  being 
too vague, inasmuch as it is open for interpretation what 
constitutes, for example, an act that “seriously intimidates a 
population”.4 Indeed, the definition of terrorism has long been 
an issue for contestation in international law. Depending 
on the criteria used to define terrorism, a group may be 
classified by one state as a terrorist organisation but not by 
other states. For example, the Hezbollah is blacklisted as a 
terrorist  organisation  by 
the  US  State  Department 
but not recognised as such 
by the EU. 
  Such  differences  may 
shape  evaluations  of  the 
various sources of financing 
that  do  not  involve  crime 
(Navias 2002: 68-69): 
•	 first,	 state	 (financial)	 sponsorship	 of	 terrorist	  
  organisations. For example, Al-Qaida received support   
  from the Government of Sudan and the former Taliban   
  Government of Afghanistan (Navias 2002: 68);
•	 second,	 private	 (financial)	 sponsorship.	 Terrorist	  
  organisations  receive  private  donations  from  political   
  sympathisers. For example, terrorist organisations may   
  receive  support  through  charity  organisations  or  a   
  political arm such as Batasuna in Spain (Europol 2009);
•	 third,	 legitimate	 business	 activities.	 For	 example,	 the	  
  legitimate construction and development corporations   
  of  the  Bin  Laden  family  funded  Al-Qaida  network   
  activities.
  Given  the  fundamental  differences  between  money 
laundering  and  terrorist  financing,  it  is  therefore 
questionable  whether  AML  measures  are  suitable  for 
CFT.  Effective  pre-emptive  measures  for  CFT  can  hardly 
rely  on  the  same  AML  policy  response  if  the  funds  for 
financing  terrorism  originate  from  legitimate  sources.   
The following sections discuss how the EU has responded to 
the peculiarities of terrorist financing and how it has addressed 
the different logics of AML and CFT in its initiatives.
Policies – The EU initiatives to combat terrorist financing
The  EU’s  effort  to  combat  the  financing  of  terrorism  has 
taken  a  two-tier,  complementary  approach.  On  the  one 
hand, the financial freezing measures were implemented 
following  the  adoption  of  UN  Security  Council  (UNSC) 
Resolutions 1267 and 1373, thus establishing an EU system 
for  targeting  and  sanctioning  individuals  and  groups 
suspected of providing assistance, financial or otherwise, 
to any terrorist organisation. This has been complemented 
by money laundering legislation in the form of the three EU 
money laundering directives and regulations on controls on 
cash entering and leaving the EU and on information on the 
payer accompanying transfers of funds.
38
www.eipa.eu
E
x
 
m
i
s
 
e
t
e
b
a
t
r
u
m
 
r
e
s
?
 
C
e
r
i
d
e
s
t
 
v
i
r
i
d
e
p
s
e
n
a
 
o
m
a
x
i
m
i
l
38
E
x
 
m
i
s
 
e
t
e
b
a
t
r
u
m
 
r
e
s
?
 
C
e
r
i
d
e
s
t
 
v
i
r
i
d
e
p
s
e
n
a
 
o
m
a
x
i
m
i
l
38
C
o
m
b
a
t
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
T
e
r
r
o
r
i
s
m
:
 
E
U
 
P
o
l
i
c
i
e
s
,
 
P
o
l
i
t
y
 
a
n
d
 
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
s
The adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon may 
substantially improve the cooperation 
in the field of CFT because the new Treaty 
abolishes the EU pillar structure and 
creates a single legal framework.Financial freezing measures
In the aftermath of the bombings of American embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 the UNSC adopted Resolution 
1267/1999.  This  was  later  extended  and  modified  by 
Resolutions  1333/2001,  1390/2002,  establishing  a  system 
for freezing funds and other financial assets or economic 
resources,  as  well  as  the  listing  of  individuals  and 
organisations  linked  to  or  part  of  the  Taliban  regime  of 
Afghanistan and Al-Qaida (United Nations 2009). At the EU 
level the implementation of 1267/1999, and the subsequent 
resolutions, took several legislative steps (for a chronological 
development of the sanctions regime see Heupel 2009). 
  The meagre results of Resolution 1267/1999 to extradite 
Bin Laden and neutralise Al-Qaida’s activities, together with 
the 9/11 attacks, prompted the UNSC to pass Resolution 
1373/2001.  The  key  differences  between  1373  and  1267 
is  the  option  given  to  UN  Member  States  to  establish 
autonomous  lists  of  suspects,  subject  only  to  scrutiny 
by  the  Security  Council  Counter-Terrorism  Committee. 
Secondly,  1373  extended  its  scope  beyond  individuals 
and  organisations  affiliated  to  the  Taliban  and  Al-Qaida 
to  encompass  all  terrorist  suspects.  The  EU  promptly 
established an autonomous system without precedent by 
adopting measures5 providing the legal ground for listing 
terrorist suspects, freezing their assets and enabling police 
and  judicial  cooperation  to  prevent  and  combat  terrorist 
acts. The EU has also tried to use its weight  to include a 
counter-terrorism clause in existing and new development 
assistance  instruments  with  third  countries.  The  clause 
provides for cooperation in the prevention and suppression 
of terrorist acts in the framework of Resolution 1373/2001 by 
exchanging information, know-how and experiences.6 
  Given that the identification of suspects may be based 
on classified evidence, which may not stand as sufficient at 
a regular court proceeding, and that the ordered sanctions 
must be executed swiftly to prevent the assets from being 
transferred or hidden (Vlcek 2009: 7), financial sanctions 
have become a powerful tool in the counter-terrorism box. 
However, as shown below, they are not necessarily the most 
effective one. 
  This  new  mechanism  marked  a  significant  change  in 
the  EU’s  role  and  position  in  combating  terrorism.  Until 
2001  the  EU  had  focused  on  the  adoption  of  traditional 
and  general  framework  legislation  to  be  implemented 
individually by the Member States. In addition, the balance 
has shifted from setting standards for the legal fight against 
terrorism to taking measures that undoubtedly approach 
enforcement  (Eling  2007:  109). The  potency  of  the  new 
mechanism becomes clearer if one takes into consideration 
that the EU accounts for a high proportion of global financial 
transactions. However, closer examination of the system’s 
effectiveness reveals that since the initial surge in 2002 of 
the amounts frozen (as reported to the UNSC) there has been 
little increase in that quantity. This may indicate that the 
terrorists have found other means to finance their activities 
or at least to move their money (Vlcek 2009: 8).
  The immediate impact and ex-ante nature of the financial 
sanctions, along with the virtual impossibility for suspects to 
defend themselves against the measures, have raised some 
concerns and doubts about due process in the listing action. 
They have also triggered a number of court cases, notably 
the  al  Barakaat  International  Foundation/Yassin  Abdullah 
Kadi case.7
  The  al  Barakaat  network  was  believed  by  the  US  to 
support financially Al-Qaida and in consequence its name 
was put on the blacklist and transposed by the UN Security 
Council Sanctions Committee into international law. As a 
result all financial assets and operations of three Swedish 
citizens of Somali origin who operated money transfers via 
al  Barakaat  financial  network  were  blocked  on  European 
territory. Third parties were forbidden to support financially 
the affected citizens. In addition, in the case of sanctions, 
the burden of proving a suspect guilty is reversed. It is now 
for the suspect to prove his or her innocence, which those 
listed in the al Barakaat case did by starting proceedings 
at the EU’s Court of First Instance. Despite the fact that the 
US  itself  withdrew  legal  proceedings  against  al  Barakaat, 
and the suspected Swedish citizens were delisted by the 
Security Council Sanctions Committee, the European Court 
of First Instance ruled against their petition (de Goede 2008: 
173). The complaint of Mr. Yassin Abdullah Kadi (a Saudi 
businessman who allegedly had links with Al-Qaida), was 
joined to the case of al Barakaat. 
  To protect fundamental rights and the principle of legal 
redress, the ECJ issued a ruling establishing the principle 
of review of EU laws that implement UN Security Council 
resolutions (Labayle and Long 2009: 4). In September 2008, 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) thus annulled the EU 
Council regulation related to Kadi and al Barakaat. Heupel 
(2009: 315) concludes that, “as this ruling can be used by 
other listed parties as a precedent, the EU is under heavy 
pressure to reform the way in which targeted UN sanctions 
are  implemented  in  EU  member  states”.  The  pressure 
resulting from the court’s rulings has already prompted the 
Commission to put forward a proposal to amend the Council 
Regulation  881/2002  and  thus  to  change  the  process  of 
imposing restrictive measures on terrorist suspects. 
Money laundering legislation
The other approach to combat the financing of terrorism 
has  its  roots  in  anti-money  laundering  legislation.  These 
measures have focused on preventive actions as opposed to 
the more repressive practice of listing suspects and freezing 
their assets.
  The most significant impetus for legislative action against 
money  laundering  has  come  from  the  Financial  Action 
Task Force (FATF), established by the G-7 Summit in Paris in 
1989 to develop a co-ordinated international response to 
the problem. One of the first tasks of FATF was to develop   
the  40  Recommendations,  which  set  out  a  framework 
for  effective  anti-money  laundering  programmes.  This 
standard-setting international forum has gained increased 
importance after 9/11. To limit the possibilities for terrorist 
organisations to use the international financial system to 
transfer funds the FATF has elaborated and recommended 
9 Special Recommendations (FATF 2004). The main push for 
legislative action to implement the FATF Recommendations 
has been peer reviews and peer pressure exerted on the   
EU  members  of  FATF  -  the  European  Commission  and   
15 Member States.8
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s  The First and Second Money Laundering Directives (MLD) , 
approved  in  1991  and  2001  respectively,  imposed  anti-
money laundering obligations first on credit and financial 
institutions and then in 2001 on the so-called Designated 
Non-Financial  Professional  Bodies  (DNFPBs)  including 
accountants,  lawyers,  notaries,  real  estate  agents,  casinos 
and dealers in high-value goods. The legislation made them 
subject  to  the  obligations  of  the  Directive  as  regards  to 
customer identification, record keeping and the reporting 
of  suspicious  transactions.  The  Directives  also  required 
the  Member  States  to  establish  Financial  Intelligence 
Units  (FIUs)  -  central  national  agencies  responsible  for 
receiving, analysing, and transmitting reports on suspicious 
transactions to the competent law enforcement authorities. 
  While  the  first  anti-money  laundering  initiatives 
concentrated on the laundering of profits generated through 
drug trafficking, the current Third MLD goes well beyond 
illegal drugs and targets any money generated by criminal 
activity.9 The Third MLD, adopted in 2005, is also the first 
anti-money laundering legislation to include the measures 
to combat the financing of terrorism. It has implemented 
most of the revised 40 FATF Recommendations (2003) and 
the 9 Special Recommendations against terrorist financing 
(Financial Action Task Force 2003). The Directive reinforces the 
oversight regime applicable to transactions in the financial 
sector, as well as to DNFPBs. In addition, it broadens the scope 
of offences by including tax fraud and encourages the FIUs 
to work together more effectively. The Directive has applied 
an  extended  version  of  the “KYC”  (Know  your  Customer) 
principle, which follows the FATF Recommendation No. 5.   
It obliges banks and financial institutions not to open accounts 
in cases where the holder is not identified or identifiable, 
to  notify  the  competent  authority  of  any  suspicious 
transactions  and  to  keep  all  supporting  documents  for  a 
minimum length of time (5 years in the case of the United 
Nations Convention) (Labayle and Long 2009: 25). Some of 
the  Special  Recommendations  have  been  covered  by  EU 
Regulations and Directives.10 Recommendation No. 9 on the 
use of cash couriers, for example, is covered by Regulation 
2005/1889/EC11 on controls of cash entering or leaving the 
Community requiring individuals crossing a state border to 
declare cash amounts equal or higher than 10,000 euros. 
Yet,  it  should  be  noted  at  this  point  that  the  Regulation 
2005/1889/EC  (Art.  2)  contains  a  considerable  loophole 
since the legislation does not relate to gold or other precious 
commodities with a value lower, equal or higher than 10,000 
euros. (Labayle and Long 2009: 25).
  However,  as  discussed  below,  despite  the  adopted 
measures  there  still  remains  a  significant  disparity  in  the 
transmission  of  statements  between  the  different  DNFPB 
professions and, in particular, quite insufficient cooperation 
of lawyers with the FIUs (Labayle and Long 2009: 26).
Polity – The institutional framework to combat terrorist 
financing
The  key  to  successful  and  effective  measures  for  CFT  is 
close cooperation and co-ordination. This involves first and 
foremost intelligence sharing, which together with special 
operations constitutes the basis for a successful fight against 
terrorism (Howell 2007: 35). As discussed above, given the 
peculiarities  of  terrorist  financing,  the  emphasis  on  the 
intelligence sharing seems to be even more important with 
CFT. 
  However,  despite  the  call  for  better  co-ordination, 
transparency  and  flexibility  across  different  agencies,  at 
national  and  European  level,12  the  EU  institutions  and 
agencies have not become the focal points for all intelligence 
cooperation in Europe. EU Member States says they agree 
that  there  should  be  a  common European approach to a 
common threat of terrorism due to its cross-border nature. 
The  European  Security  Strategy  reads: “Europe  is  both  a 
target and a base for [...] terrorism [...] Concerted European 
action is indispensable”.13 On the other hand, the governments 
are hesitant to give the EU extra resources and powers. This 
may stem from the fact that collaboration, from the point of 
view of Member States’ security agencies, is primarily driven 
by their national security agenda (Lander 2004). As Bossong 
(2008: 25) puts it: “the EU’s counterterrorism policy has become 
more and more limited to technical and supportive policies, 
whereas the main responsibility of the member states has 
been underlined.”
  Other  reasons  for  reluctance  in  intelligence-sharing 
include the lack of trust among the agencies, which follows 
the logic that the larger the number of actors involved, the 
greater  the probability  that  the  sensitive  information  will 
leak. Furthermore, since security, including the protection 
of  citizens  and  infrastructure,  is  at  the  core  of  national 
sovereignty, the Member State governments are primarily 
held accountable and responsible for countering terrorism. 
Therefore,  the  national  security  agencies  are  tasked  to 
produce  and  provide  national  enforcement  services 
with  complete  intelligence. This  is  especially  true  for  the 
assessment and dissemination of operational and tactical 
counter-terrorism intelligence (Müller-Wille 2008). 
  The lack of – and the need for – operational collaboration 
was  made  clear  by  the  European  Counter-Terrorism 
Coordinator – Gilles de Kerchove, who stated that: “not all 
cases of prosecution or investigation are sent to Europol or 
Eurojust, respectively. So it is important for me to remind 
Member States of this obligation” (de Kerchove 2008). 
  This point of view was supported by the Opinion of the 
European  Economic  and  Social  Committee,  which  pointed 
out  that: “the  roles  of  the  Member  States,  EU  institutions, 
Europol, Eurojust, etc. are well defined, but it is above all the 
operational nature of cooperation within intelligence agencies 
and investigations which requires constant improvement.”14
  Despite the adoption of Council Decision 2000/642/JHA on 
cooperation between FIUs, which was intended to harmonise 
and improve the exchange of intelligence between them, 
Member States do not cooperate with each other in the same 
way, nor do they contribute to the same extent to the relevant 
Europol Analysis Work Files on terrorist financing. The lack of 
cooperation is also evident between the FIUs and Europol. 
The FIU.net project has not yet achieved its original ambitions.   
It  consists  of  a  secure  system  through  which  the  FIUs 
involved in the project can share financial intelligence. This 
platform, initiated in 2000 by the Netherlands in cooperation 
with  the  UK  and  Belgium,  is  still  not  being  used  by  all   
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sEU Member States, despite its endorsement by the European 
Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (Labayle and Long 2009: 20). 
It seems that for the time-being the only type of intelligence 
which is produced and shared at the EU level is the one to 
support decision-making at the strategic level. 
  A slightly better picture appears from the experience of 
the EU’s Situation Centre (SitCen) located in the Council’s 
General Secretariat and reporting to the High Representative 
for the CFSP/Secretary-General of the Council of the European 
Union. It provides the High Representative and the European 
Council with strategic analyses of the terrorist menace. It relies 
on  and  combines  the  intelligence  assessments  provided 
by the Member States, the EU’s own information channels 
and open sources. In consequence, SitCen produces original 
intelligence that either no national agency is willing/able 
to produce or where a single country’s report would not be 
acceptable from the political point of view.  
  The internal structure of SitCen is also particular in that 
the  Civilian  Intelligence  Cell  and  the  Counter  Terrorism   
Cell  cluster  seconded  national  experts  from  foreign  and 
domestic intelligence services. It is worth noting that the 
initiative followed the Madrid bombings and the adoption 
of the “Solidarity Clause” by the European Council. However, 
not  all  Member  States 
were  able  to  delegate 
their  national  experts. 
Therefore  it  appears  to 
be  a  sort  of  an  insiders’ 
club  composed  of  those 
Member States who have 
necessary intelligence and 
analysis capacities and who had already established good 
working relationships outside the EU’s framework (Müller-
Wille 2008: 62). 
  It is thus unsurprising that the bulk of counter-terrorism 
cooperation at the operational level takes place outside of 
the formal EU framework on a bi- and multi-lateral basis.   
As  an  example,  there  are  the  cooperation  agreements 
between France and Spain, signed in 2004, which created a 
combined counter-terrorism unit, or the agreement between 
the  UK  and  Ireland  in  2005,  which  expanded  their  long-
standing cooperation. Some groups of Member States have 
decided to deepen their collaboration on sharing personal 
data  and  operational  counter-terrorism  intelligence  as  in 
the case with the signatories of the Treaty of Prüm or the 
members of the G6 (France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain 
and the UK).15 
  The  early  detection,  prevention  and  investigation  of 
terrorism depend on a combination of signals and pieces 
of evidence from many different sources. As stated in the 
Independent Scrutiny on the EU’s Efforts in the Fight Against 
Terrorist Financing: “it is the art of sourcing and combining 
data and finding meaningful relationships and clues leading 
to individuals or groups that adds value to CFT (and CT) 
measures” (Howell 2007: 39). 
  In short, smart cooperation at the EU institutional level 
could add value and contribute more effectively to counter 
terrorism and terrorist financing which seems to be politically 
unfeasible for the time-being. However, the adoption of the 
Treaty of Lisbon may substantially improve the cooperation 
in the field of CFT because the new Treaty abolishes the EU 
pillar structure and creates a single legal framework.
Politics – The European contribution to the “war on terror” 
As discussed above, one reason why it is so difficult for the 
EU to cooperate on CFT is because security policy belongs 
to hard politics. At the heart of the matter are therefore 
issues of state sovereignty. The term “war on terror”, first 
coined  by  President  George  W.  Bush  shortly  after  the 
9/11  attacks,  illustrates  well  that  the  discourse  around 
the politics of CFT has quickly concentrated on survival.16  
The European contribution to the “war on terror” or the 
“fight against terrorism”, to use the arguably more neutral 
terms employed by the EU, cannot be underestimated and 
is  critical  for  the  following  three  reasons  (Wright  2006).   
First, Europe was and is a target for considerable terrorist 
activity. Second, from the geopolitical point of view, Europe 
is well placed to support third countries in their efforts for   
CFT. In this regards, it should be mentioned that the EU 
and the Council of Europe have financially and technically   
supported  blacklisted  countries,  such  as  Ukraine   
(blacklisted by the FATF in Autumn 2001), to build up their 
capacity and institutional 
infrastructure  (e.g. 
FIU)  for  AML  and  CFT. 
Third,  the  European 
contribution is important 
because,  unlike  the  US, 
Europe has longstanding 
experience with fighting 
terrorism, specifically the UK with paramilitary organisations 
in  Northern  Ireland,  Germany  with  the  left-wing  Red 
Army Faction, Italy with the Red Brigades and Spain with 
the  terrorists  of  ETA. The  valuable  experience  gained  in 
fighting terrorism remains highly relevant to counter “new 
terrorism”.17
  All  the  preceding  points  show  that  Europe  –  despite 
the current challenges at the co-operational level – could 
make  an  even  more  valuable  contribution  and  why  the 
war on terror serves Europe’s own security interest. Yet, the 
European contribution also has revealed “a division of labour 
in the international system that has been apparent, if not 
universally endorsed for some time with the United States 
providing  military  power  and  the  Europeans  providing 
“civilian’ power” (Wright 2006: 282).
  Europe is widely portrayed as a civilian power that favours 
law  enforcement  and  policing  while  the  US  is  a  military 
power that uses pre-emptive military means to fight against 
terrorism.  Associated  with  this  perception  is  an  image  of 
Europe as being the “weak link in the international campaign” 
(Wright 2006: 281). However, the juxtaposition of Europe 
providing “civilian power” and the US of providing military 
power overlooks the fact that the EU in some respects has 
gone beyond the international policy guidance to combat 
terrorist financing. In fact, as the cases of Kadi and al Barakaat 
show, the EU has not been merely a reluctant follower of US-
driven (Taylor 2007: 12-18), UN and FATF guidance.
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It is important to engage the public in a 
dialogue on liberty/security in order to reach 
a compromise on what is acceptable to 
manage the unease.  The US strategy for the war on terror is, indeed, above 
all  a  doctrine  of  pre-emption  (cf  White  House  2002:  6).   
The  problems  generated  by  the  related  precautionary 
security practices are evident (for an interrogation of the 
arguments related to the risk and precautionary procedures 
see Heng 2006; Heng and McDonagh 2008; Williams 2008). 
The doctrine has raised a strong discussion on the questions 
of  accountability  and  legitimacy  as  it  empowers  non-
elected officials and private agents such as private banks 
and airlines, to implement surveillance measures. It has had 
a considerable bearing on the EU Member States’ approach 
to terrorism as well. As the cases of Kadi and al Barakaat 
demonstrate, the decision and policy-making on the basis 
of  imagined  catastrophes  bear  the  high  potential  risk  of 
wrongful arrests and assets freezing (de Goede 2008: 179). 
As soon as a security dimension is attached to the debate, it 
quickly becomes a “life or death” discourse that gives leverage 
to perceived terrorist threats and increased surveillance at 
the  costs  of  strong  restrictions  on  individual  privacy  and 
accepting wrongful decision-making. In addition, the logic 
of  precautionary  security  principles  justifies  disastrous 
incidences  like  the  London  Metropolitan  Police  shooting 
of Jean-Charles de Menezes in 2005. It is also this “state of 
permanent fear” that legitimises the erosion of civil liberties 
(Buzan 2006; Vlcek 2007). However, fears and threats are not 
determined in relation to measurable risks but to perceived 
risks;  they  are  patently  subjective  and  relative. To  design 
effective CFT policies without impinging too much on civil 
liberties, policy- and decision-makers should therefore take 
into account the concerns expressed by the citizens. It is 
thus important to engage the public more successfully in a 
dialogue on liberty/security to reach a compromise on what 
is acceptable to reduce terrorist threats.
  To conclude, given the inherent complex structure and 
different  phenomena  of  terrorism,  it  is  no  surprise  that 
financial surveillance has delivered mixed results to counter 
terrorist  financing.  Much  of  the  difficulties  are  related  to 
the fact that funding for terrorist acts may be generated 
from legal sources and second, as the Madrid and London 
bombings demonstrated, that it does not require large sums 
in order to cause deadly disruptions. In addition, terrorists 
are quick in adjusting to the new environment of financial 
surveillance  and  adopting  counter-measures.  The  real 
challenge for the international community is therefore to put 
terrorism into perspective and judge appropriately on the 
risks of threats without impinging too much on civil liberties. 
A step into this direction is to create a public dialogue to 
reach a compromise on what is acceptable to manage the 
unease. 
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1  “Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the   
  Council of 26 October 2005 on the Prevention of the Use of the   
  Financial  System  for  the  Purpose  of  Money  Laundering  and   
  Terrorist Financing.” OJ L 309, 25 November 2005, p. 15-36.
2  For example, the Northern Irish IRA and UVF or the Colombian   
  FARC  and  the  Peruvian  Sendero  Luminoso  financed  their   
  activities partly through drug trafficking, kidnapping for ransom   
  and bank robbery.
3  Art.  1,  “Council  Framework  Decision”  of  13  June  2002  on   
  combating terrorism, OJ L 164, 22 June 2002, p. 3.
4  On  the  basis  of  this  definition,  for  instance,  a  Greenpeace   
  protest in Denmark in 2003, was charged under EU anti-terror   
  laws (Statewatch Observatory 2005).
5  The Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the   
  application of specific measures to combat terrorism, OJ L 344. 
  and Council Regulation (EC) No. 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001   
  on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons   
  and  entities  with  a  view  to  combating  terrorism,  OJ  L  344,   
  28 December 2001.
6  “EU Counter-Terrorism Clauses: Assessment.” 14458/2/04.
7  Case C-415/05P, “Al Barakaat International Foundation / Council   
  and  Commission”,  Yassin  Abdullah  Kadi  and  Al  Barakaat   
  International Foundation, ECR 2008 p. I-06351.
8  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,   
  Ireland,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Luxembourg,  Portugal,  Spain,   
  Sweden, the UK.
9  “Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the   
  Council of 26 October 2005 on the Prevention of the Use of the   
  Financial  System  for  the  Purpose  of  Money  Laundering  and   
  Terrorist Financing.” OJ L 309, 25 November 2005, p. 15-36.
10  However,  the  Third  Directive  did  not  address  the  Special   
  Recommendation 6 concerning alternative remittance systems   
  (informal value transfer services) and Special Recommendation   
  7 concerning wire transfers. Recommendation No. 6 has been   
  covered by the Payment Services Directive 2007/64/EC (PSD)   
  and the issue of wire transfer was addressed by the Regulation   
  on Information on the Payer Accompanying Transfers of Funds   
  2006/1781/EC.
11  “Regulation (EC) No. 1889/2005 of the European Parliament and   
  of the Council of 26 October 2005 on controls of cash entering or   
  leaving the Community.” OJ L 309, 25 November 2005, p. 9-12.
12  “Report  on  the  Implementation  of  the  European  Security   
  Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World.” In S407/08.   
  Brussels, 11 December 2008, p. 4.
13  “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy.”   
  Council of the European Union, 15849/03 Brussels, 5 December   
  2003.
14  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on   
  the Prevention of terrorism and violent radicalisation, OJ C 211,   
  19 August 2008, para. 3.13.
15  It  should  be  noted  that  there  has  been  a  more  positive   
  development of incorporating the multilateral agreements into   
  the  EU’s  legal  framework  as  the  case  of  the Treaty  of  Prüm   
  shows.
16  In January 2009 UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband officially   
  declared  that  the  “war  on  terror”  was  wrong  and  both  a   
  “misleading and mistaken” doctrine that rally extremists against   
  the West (Miliband 2009).
17  New terrorism is often equated “to highly decentralised entities   
  motivated by religious fundamentalism” (Wright 2006: 282).43
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